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Taking the Constitution at Its Word: A
Defense of the Use of Anti-Gang Injunctions
GREGORY S. WALSTON*
Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a
window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of
the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighbor-
hoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily
occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by deter-
mined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-
lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one
cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.'
INTRODUCTION
Communities throughout America are beset by increasing problems
of gang violence. Once confined to inner cities, gang activities have
erupted to threaten virtually all neighborhoods in America, turning for-
merly unfathomed acts of violence into familiar news stories.2 Public
schools have erupted into war zones;3 individuals have been slain
merely for wearing the wrong color;4 entire communities have become
virtual hostages because they live in a neighborhood that is the occupied
"turf' of a criminal street gang.5
* Deputy Attorney General, State of California. J.D., University of California, Davis; B.A.,
Columbia University. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the positions of the California Attorney General.
1. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (emphasis deleted).
2. See Susan Ferriss, Teen Gangs: The Crazy Life Sweeping Sonoma County "Gangsta"
Culture Is Steadily Catching on Among Bored Suburban Youth, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 30, 1997, at
D1 (explaining exportation of gangs from urban to suburban and rural communities). In fact, the
estimated number of gang members in rural Sonoma County, California, increased from 300 in
1991 to 1050 in 1997. See id.
3. See J.R. Moehringer, Littleton Killings Strike at Heart of U.S., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1999,
at Al (discussing school shootings by "trenchcoat mafia").
4. See generally FRED A. CLARK, TEENAGE STREET GANGS (1996) (discussing territorial
aspects of gang clothing).
5. This scenario is depicted most vividly in the words of Justice Brown, writing for the
majority in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna:
Gang members, all of whom lived elsewhere, congregated on lawns, on sidewalks,
and in front of apartment complexes at all hours of the day and night .... [O]penly
drinking, smoking dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting cocaine... [Residents]
are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity, fistfights and the sound
of gunfire echoing in the streets. Gang members take over sidewalks, driveways,
carports, and apartment parking areas, and impeded traffic on public thoroughfares
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The rising problem of gang violence has overwhelmed conven-
tional law enforcement techniques. District Attorneys cannot combat
criminal street gangs effectively because gang members intimidate
potential witnesses into turning a blind eye to the criminal activities of
the street gang.6 One study has indicated that Los Angeles County,
alone, had 150,000 gang members in 1992.1 Another study has demon-
strated that gang members outnumbered police officers at a ratio of six
to one in Los Angeles County.8 In short, in the midst of overwhelming
lawlessness and violence, conventional law enforcement techniques are
rendered ineffective in combating modern street gangs. 9
Law enforcement agencies have been left with no choice but to
search for more effective gang-prevention techniques.10 The most effec-
tive of these new techniques is perhaps the most novel - enjoining the
gang as a public nuisance. Although this practice was born in Los
Angeles,' it first attracted notoriety when it was employed in a San
Jose, California, neighborhood known as "Rocksprings," an area in
which gang activity had reached a level of grim intensity. ' 2 Members of
the Varrio Surefio Treces gang' 3 literally took over Rocksprings, sub-
jecting local residents to virtual mob rule. 14
Residents of Rocksprings became prisoners in their own homes.1 5
to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar. Murder, attempted murder, drive-by
shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace ...
[R]esidents have had their garages used as urinals, their homes commandeered as
escape routes; their walls, fences, garage doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles
turned into a sullen canvas of gang graffiti.
929 P.2d. 596, 601 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1998).
6. See Nick Anderson, S.J. Makes Move to Reclaim Gang Territory, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 10, 1993, at IA (reporting traditional police methods have proven insufficient to
control gang activity in San Jose); Richard L. Colvin, Judge Issues Sweeping Injunction Against
Gang, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at BI (home ed.) (reporting deficiencies of traditional police
techniques against gangs in Van Nuys).
7. See OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATr'Y, COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, GANGS, CRIME AND
VIOLENCE IN Los ANGELES, at iv (1992) ("Los Angeles is generally acknowledged to have the
worst street gang problem in the nation, if not the world"); see also Susan L. Burrel, Gang
Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 743-44 (1990) (noting
Southern California is facing "an unprecedented gang holocaust").
8. See CRIME, THE WILSON RECORD 7 (summarizing gang problem in Los Angeles County).
9. See Bureau of Investigation, Cal. Dep't of Justice, GANGS 2000: A CALL TO ACTION
(1993) (noting substantial growth of gangs and need for more effective law enforcement).
10. Christopher S. Yoo, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as Public
Nuisances, 89 N.W. L. REv. 212, 215 (1994) (discussing perceived necessity of anti-gang
injunctions).
11. See People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
County, Dec. I1, 1987) (issuing limited preliminary injunction against street gang).
12. See generally People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 596 (Cal. 1997).
13. Also known as Varrio Surefio Town or Varrio Sureno Locos. See id. at 611.
14. See id. at 601-02.
15. See id.
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Their friends and family refused to visit. 16 They remained indoors,
especially at night, and they did not allow their children to play
outside. 7 A little girl who was allowed to play outside was threatened
by Varrio Surefio Treces members, who told her they would cut out her
tongue if she ever cooperated with the authorities.18
Rocksprings residents were overwhelmed by the problems created
by gangs.19 As a result, the San Jose City Attorney sought an injunction
against the activities of the Varrio Surefio Treces gang on grounds that
the gang was a public nuisance."z The trial court agreed with the City
Attorney, and issued the injunction.2' The injunction prohibited gang
members from (1) congregating with other Varrio Surefio Treces mem-
bers within Rocksprings; (2) trespassing or defacing the property of
Rocksprings residents; and (3) harassing, intimidating, and annoying
local residents of Rocksprings.22
Upon appeal of the injunction by the Varrio Surefio Treces mem-
bers, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the "harassing, intimidat-
ing and annoying" language of the injunction was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad and that the prohibition of the gangmembers' con-
gregating in Rocksprings violated their First Amendment right to free
association.2 3 The appellate court struck down fifteen of the twenty-four
provisions of the injunction, including the prohibition of Varrio Surefio
Treces members from congregating and the prohibition of gang harass-
ment, intimidation, and annoyance of local residents.24
The City Attorney successfully sought review by the California
Supreme Court .2  The California Supreme Court, in People ex rel.
26 2Gallo v. Acuna overturned the appellate decision. 7 Underscoring the
critical gang problems in Rocksprings and throughout America, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the anti-gang injunction was neither
vague nor overbroad because its terms were reasonably clear in the con-
16. See id. at 602.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 624 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
19. As noted by Justice Brown, "[V]erbal harassment, physical intimidation, threats of
retaliation, and retaliation are the likely fate of anyone who complains of the gang's illegal
activities or tells police where drugs may be hidden." Id. at 602.
20. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601; see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (1997).
21. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601; see also infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (explaining
specific terms of anti-gang injunctions).
22. See Acuna, 929 P.2d. at 624 n.3 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (setting forth specific terms of
injunction against Varrio Surefio Treces gang).
23. See id. at 602 (discussing Court of Appeal's decision).
24. See id.
25. See id. (discussing procedural history of Acuna).
26. Id. at 596.
27. See generally id.
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text of the Varrio Surefio Treces gang. 8 The Court also held that the
anti-gang injunction did not violate the free association rights of the
Varrio Surefio Treces members because there is no cognizable First
Amendment right to free association implicated by membership in a
criminal street gang.29
Although the Varrio Surefio Treces members sought certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court, the writ was denied.3 ° Thus, in Cali-
fornia, anti-gang injunctions have become an established law enforce-
ment tool.3' In fact, California law enforcement agencies have
welcomed anti-gang injunctions as the appropriate solution for an urban
problem that has grown out of control.32 The California Legislature has
amended the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
Act to permit the California Attorney General to maintain an action
against enjoined street gangs for damages. 33  Support for anti-gang
injunctions in California has been fueled by its success as a weapon to
combat gang activity.34
Not all, however, share these sentiments. Many commentators
have criticized the California Supreme Court's decision in Acuna.
These critics call the use of injunctive relief against gangs violative of
the gang members' First Amendment rights to free association and free
speech, as well as the right to due process of law.35 The most impas-
28. See id. at 618.
29. See id.
30. 521 U.S. 1121 (1998).
31. See generally Julie Gannon Shoop, Gang Warfare: Legal Battle Pits Personal Liberty
Against Public Safety, TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 12 (discussing acceptance of anti-gang injunctions in
California).
32. See id. (quoting City Attorney, "[T]he injunction brought an overnight result"); see also
Bergen Herd, Note, Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-Related Problems in California After
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 629, 675 (1998)
(discussing success of anti-gang injunctions).
33. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.20 (1999).
34. Rocksprings residents were reported as finally feeling safe in their homes; arrests
decreased by seventy-four percent; and violent crime dropped by eighty-four percent. Further,
crime did not shift to surrounding areas, as some critics predicted. See Bergen Herd, Note,
Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-Related Problems in California After People ex rel. Gallo v.
Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 629, 675-76 (1998); see also Shoop,
supra note 31, at 12-13 (discussing anti-gang injunction as "overnight success").
35. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining and addressing criticisms of
injunctive relief against gangs); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999)
(holding anti-gang restriction invalid under substantive due process principles); O.C. v. State, 722
So.2d 839, 841-42 (1998) (refusing to uphold sentencing enhancement for gang affiliation under
constitutional principles). Unfortunately, a few who share these sentiments have resorted to
accusations of racism against those who support the anti-gang injunctions. See, e.g., Gary
Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil
Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2268-78 (1998) (attributing anti-gang injunctions to aversive
racism). Stewart implies that Justice Brown, writing for the majority in Acuna, was an aversive
racist. See id. at 2276. Stewart was apparently unaware that Justice Brown is Afro-American.
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sioned criticism of the Acuna injunction comes from Justice Mosk, the
lone dissenter in Acuna. Justice Mosk apparently viewed the Acuna
injunction as a racially-discriminatory deprivation of the rights of Lati-
nos to free association under the First Amendment.36 Justice Mosk com-
plained that the injunction against the Varrio Surefio Treces gang
"deprives a number of simple rights to a group of Latino youths."
37
Pointing to Benjamin Franklin's admonition that "[t]hey that can give up
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty
nor safety,"38 Justice Mosk concluded, inter alia, that the portions of the
injunction limiting the gang's right to associate with one another should
be stricken.39
Arguments that anti-gang injunctions are unconstitutional have
been fueled recently by the United States Supreme Court decision in
City of Chicago v. Morales.4" In Morales, the Supreme Court deter-
mined the constitutionality of a "gang loitering" ordinance.4" The Chi-
cago ordinance prohibited individuals from loitering with gang
members. 2 The ordinance defined "gang member" as any individual a
police officer reasonably believes to be in a gang. 3 The ordinance
defined "loitering" as "remain[ing] in one place with no apparent
purpose."'"
The court struck down the ordinance in a plurality opinion finding
the definition of loitering unconstitutionally vague because neither citi-
zens nor police officers could discern what constituted "remaining in
one place with no apparent purpose."45 The Court concluded that this
vagueness did not provide insufficient notice of the prohibited conduct
and consequentially allowed for arbitrary enforcement by the police. 6
Morales, however, is not controlling on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of anti-gang injunctions. Anti-gang injunctions, unlike the
gang loitering ordinance at issue in Morales, unambiguously define spe-
cific types of prohibited conduct.47 The Morales Court recognized the
Indeed, the fact that Stewart repeatedly referred to Justice Brown as "he" indicates Stewart was
also unaware that Justice Brown is a woman.
36. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 199 S.Ct. 1849 (1999).
41. See id. at 1854 (describing characteristics of Chicago ordinance).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1859.
46. See id. at 1860-61.
47. See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (arguing that anti-gang injunctions are not
unconstitutionally vague).
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narrow scope of its holding, stating expressly that the decision was lim-
ited to the specific ambiguities in the Chicago ordinance.48 Justice
O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, wrote:
It is important to courts and legislatures alike that we character-
ize more clearly the narrow scope of today's holding. As the ordi-
nance comes to this Court, it is unconstitutionally vague.
Nevertheless, there remain open to Chicago reasonable alternatives to
combat the very real threat posed by gang intimidation and violence.
For example, the Court properly and expressly distinguishes the ordi-
nance from laws that require loiterers to have a "harmful purpose,"
from laws that target only gang members, and from laws that incor-
porate limits on the area and manner in which the laws may be
enforced. In addition the ordinance here is unlike a law that
"directly prohibit[s]" the "'presence of a large collection of obvi-
ously brazen, insistent and lawless gang members and hangers on in
the public ways"' that "'intimidates residents."' 49
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Morales does not implicate
the constitutionality of anti-gang injunctions. More direct attacks on the
constitutionality of anti-gang injunctions, such as Justice Mosk's, also
ring hollow. At the outset, Justice Mosk's characterization of anti-gang
injunctions as a deprivation of Latino rights diverts the issue. Anti-gang
injunctions do not implicate race. They target all gang-related activities,
irrespective of the gang's racial composition.5" Thus, Justice Mosk's
attempt to cast injunctions into a light of racial animus is utterly
misguided.
Justice Mosk's quotation of Benjamin Franklin also fails to support
the conclusion that the concerted lawlessness of street gangs is protected
by the Constitution.5 Although Justice Mosk may think the residents of
Rocksprings "deserve neither safety nor liberty" because they "seek a
little safety" from the Varrio Sureio Treces gang, his view is not legally
supported.52 Egregious acts of concerted lawlessness and violence are
48. See Morales, 119 S.Ct. at 1857, 1864.
49. Id. at 1864 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (setting
forth language of injunction). There is no indication at any point in the majority, concurring, or
dissenting opinions in Acuna that gang membership was limited to Latinos. See generally id.
Indeed, some of the local residents of Rocksprings were presumably people of color, yet the
dissent is notably unconcerned by the numerous violations of their rights by the Varrio Surefio
Treces gang. See id.
51. In fact, Justice Mosk's quotation of Benjamin Franklin is out of context. Benjamin
Franklin was criticizing those who refused to fight the oppressive British Monarchy.
Axiomatically, Franklin did not seek to inhibit the citizens of a local community from standing up
to an oppressive street gang. See id.
52. Id. at 623.
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not constitutionally protected activities.53 To hold otherwise would
effectively turn the Constitution on its head by destroying the ability of
the government to govern and rendering constitutionally protected lib-
erty a perpetuum of anarchy.
The California Supreme Court correctly held that gang activities
may be enjoined as public nuisances. The activities of street gangs rely
on territorial control carried out by violence and threats of violence.54 It
is well established and indeed necessary, that an individual who com-
mits an act of violence may be prosecuted without constitutional
implication.55
Anti-gang injunctions are the appropriate reconciliation of the rele-
vant competing interests. The civil liberties of the gang members are at
stake, the public safety and welfare interests of the community are
threatened, and the rights of the common citizen are at risk. Because it
is unreasonable to expect the common citizen to constantly be subjected
to the inherent intimidation and violence of criminal street gangs, anti-
gang injunctions present the proper solution for resolving these conflict-
ing interests.
This Article defends the constitutionality of anti-gang injunctions,
which requires a two-step analysis. The first consideration is whether
gang activities constitute a public nuisance.56 The second consideration
is whether it is constitutional to enjoin the activities of a street gang. 7
I. AN APPLICATION OF STREET GANG ACTIVITIES To NUISANCE LAW
The threshold issue turns on whether the activities of street gangs
are public nuisances in the first instance. This analysis involves a
detailed examination of the common law definitions of public and pri-
vate nuisances as they have evolved in state courts. The analysis also
examines how those principles have been codified by statute in various
53. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1990) (holding activity with only
incidental expression is not constitutionally protected); see also infra notes 78-214 and
accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of gang injunctions); accord Robert Teir,
Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive
Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285, 322 (1993) (arguing constitutionally protected activity is properly
limited to conduct intended to have an expressive element); Gregory S. Walston, Examining the
Constitutional Implications of Begging Prohibitions in California, 20 WHITriER L. REV. 547
(1999).
54. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (explaining nature and motive of gang
activities).
55. As noted by the Supreme Court, "A physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment." Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 484 (1988) (examining First Amendment implications on regulation of violent acts).
56. See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 78-214 and accompanying text.
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state legislatures. An application of the attributes of street gangs to the
general nuisance principles used by most state courts confirms the con-
clusion that gang activities fall squarely within the definition of a public
nuisance. 8
A. Principles of Nuisance at Common Law
As noted by Justice Brown, who wrote for the majority in Acuna,
"There are few 'forms of action' in the history of Anglo-American law
with a pedigree older than suits seeking to restrain nuisances, whether
public or private."59 The modem action for abatement of a public nui-
sance originated during the reign of Richard Il 6° It is no surprise, then,
that underlying an action for nuisance is the ancient maxim, sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedus, or one must use his own right as not to infringe
on the rights of others.6 1 In other words, the determination of whether
an activity is a nuisance requires the reconciliation of the perpetually
competing interests of the rights of the individual and the rights of the
many.62
By allowing a cause of action for abatement of a nuisance, the com-
mon law courts of England, as well as the subsequent state courts of
America, recognized a fundamental principle of governance-no liberty
is absolute, and the State has a responsibility to govern its citizens by
properly balancing individual liberty against the liberties of others.63
The courts were not the first to recognize this duty. Political philoso-
phers during the early democracy movement agreed that an individual's
acceptance of the peace and safety offered by a sovereign required the
individual to sacrifice the right to unfettered liberty.64
58. See infra, notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
59. People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
60. See id. (citing the Stat. of 12 Rich. II, 1389, ch. 13 and, declaring "casting dung, etc." into
waters and ditches a nuisance).
61. See Richardson v. Kiev, 34 Cal. 63, 73 (1867) (stating general maxim underlying public
nuisance actions); see also 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 1 (1971) (discussing general attributes of
public nuisance); see generally San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669 (Cal.
1996).
62. See 58 AM. JUR. 2 D Nuisances § 35 (1971) (discussing nature and limits of action for
public nuisance); see also People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 50-51
(1987) (applying public nuisance principles).
63. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) ("The very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which
society as a whole has important interests."); accord LOCKE, TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (D. Appleton-Century Co. 1937) (discussing balance
between individual rights and sovereign powers).
64. These arguments are most distinctly set forth in the "Social Compact" theories of
eighteenth century philosophers. As stated by John Locke:
For when any number of men by the consent of every individual, made a
community, that they have thereby made that community, one body with a power to
[Vol. 54:47
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Reconciliation of the rights of the individual and the rights of soci-
ety is of particular importance in an action for public nuisance. While a
private nuisance is characterized by an unreasonable exercise of an indi-
vidual's right at the expense of another individual's rights, a public nui-
sance is characterized by an unreasonable exercise of an individual is
right at the expense of a public right.65 Such a determination necessarily
involves a balancing test, where the importance of the individual right is
weighed against the importance of the public right.6 6 If the public right
is determined to be more important than the exercise of the private right,
courts will hold that the exercise of the private right is unreasonable and
will enjoin it as a public nuisance.67
Thus, a public nuisance was defined at common law as a substantial
and unreasonable interference with a public right.6" The various courts
that have applied this definition have emphasized that this is a contex-
tual determination that is resolved by weighing the totality of all relevant
act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For
that which acts any community being only the consent of the individuals of it, and
being one body must move one way it is necessary the body should move that way
whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority ... and so
every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority ....
Id. at 63. Rousseau, too, argued that each individual equally submits himself to a social compact.
As each individual is an equal part of the compact, sovereignty in the state is composed of the
combined will, or the "general will", of each member of the State, and ruled accordingly. Rous-
SEAu, THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS (Victor Gaurevitch ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1997) (1762). David Hume also envisioned a social contract whereby the sovereignty
of the State was created by the submission of each individual. See HUME, A POLITICAL ESSAY,
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1754). These social compact political philosophers left a distinct
impression on the Framers. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing balance between sovereignty and liberty). This struggle between
the rights of the individual and the rights of the many, known as the "Madisonian Dilemma," lives
to this day. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 129-140 (1992).
65. See generally, 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisance (1971) (discussing distinction between private
nuisance and public nuisance); see also Robert Cohen, Bad Lands: Many Alternatives to CERCLA
for the Recovery of Environmental Cleanup Costs, 17 Los ANGELES LAWYER 11 (1995).
66. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisance (1971) (discussing scope of public nuisance).
67. See Hassel v. San Francisco, 78 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Cal. 1938) (addressing claim for
abatement of public nuisance); see generally Treisman v. Kamen, 493 A.2d 466, 469 (N.H. 1985)
(balancing the harm to plaintiff in nuisance action against the utility of defendant's conduct). At
common law, a nuisance was merely an injury to some interest in land. Most jurisdictions
subsequently have expanded the scope of a nuisance to involve property or personal rights. See 58
AM JUR 2D Nuisance §§ 1-2 (1971) (explaining general definitions of nuisance).
68. See generally Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239 (Kan. App. 1981)
(discussing common law public nuisance); Exxon Corp v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990 (Md. App.
1986)(addressing reasonableness of activity); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct., 920
P.2d. 669 (Cal. 1996); Anderson v. Souza, 243 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1951) (weighing private right
against public harm in adjudicating nuisance claim); Weber v. Peiretti, 178 A.2d 92 (N.J. Ch.
1962) (employing reasonableness test in adjudicating nuisance action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, § 821B, cmt.e (1965) (defining public nuisance as an "interference with a right
common to the general public").
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
factors.69 In sum, a common law action for public nuisance lies where a
defendant's conduct amounted to a substantial and unreasonable inter-
ference with a public right, given the totality of the facts.
B. Statutory Developments of Nuisance Principles
During the last century, most jurisdictions have codified actions for
public nuisance.70 Indeed, the modem statutory nuisance has effectively
obviated the common law nuisance. Although an action for a common
law nuisance still technically exists, modem state courts generally are
unwilling to declare an activity a common law nuisance in lieu of declar-
ing it a nuisance by statute.7 '
Notwithstanding this development, most state legislatures define a
public nuisance so broadly that the courts inevitably return to the com-
mon law to determine whether the activity is reasonable in light of the
totality of the facts.72 For example, California defines a public nuisance
as:
[a]nything that is injurious to the public health, is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or obstructs the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property or that
unlawfully obstructs the free passage of use, in the customary man-
ner, of any . . . public park, street or highway...73
C. Application of Nuisance Principles to Street Gangs
Under a plain application of public nuisance principles, the illicit
activities of street gangs are a public nuisance. A neighborhood occu-
69. See generally Portman v. Clemintina Co., 305 P.2d 963 (Cal. App. 1957) (motive alone is
not determinative of whether nuisance lies); see also 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisance, § 1 (1971)
(discussing general nature of nuisance).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-160.1 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-343a (1999);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-5901; MICH CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2425 (1948). California also has
enacted various "nuisance per se" statutes, which declare specific activities public nuisances. See,
e.g., CAL. Gov'T. CODE, § 50231 (1998) (abandoned excavations); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE,
§§ 3757, 3760 (1984) (well drilling locations); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22a (1999) (buildings or
houses operated by street gangs for illicit purposes).
71. See People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Cal. 1941) (indicating that courts lack legal
authority to extend the definition of a wrong not provided for by statute); see also People ex rel.
Gallo et al. v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606-07 (Cal. 1997) (concluding courts lack authority to find
public nuisance in absence of statutory definition).
72. See supra, note 70 and accompanying text (setting forth various states' nuisance statutes);
see, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp 1219, 1233 (D. Mass. 1986) (addressing
reasonableness issue of nuisance claim); Bronson v. Oscoda, 470 N.W.2d 688, 690-91 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991); Leo v. General Elec. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (A.D. 1989); Brown v. Scioto City
Bd. of Comm. 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1158-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Wemke v. Halas, 600 N.W.2d
117, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
73. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (1997).
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pied as gang "turf' becomes unsafe for local residents."4 Residents'
property rights become subservient to the mob rule of the gang mem-
bers, who enter residents' homes, deface their vehicles, threaten their
friends and families, peddle drugs, and loudly congregate on their
lawns.75 Such actions are utterly devoid of any public benefit and are a
naked and unmitigated interference with the public safety and welfare
rights of the local community.
Accordingly, gang activities are unreasonable under a public nui-
sance analysis. Given the totality of the facts, gang activities substan-
tially interfere with the property rights of the members of the local
community, who are coerced into allowing gang members trample the
rights of community residents by using fear and coercion.76 Further, the
gang has no social benefit to mitigate its detrimental impact on the com-
munity.77 Thus, street gangs fall squarely within the definition of a pub-
lic nuisance.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALIDITY OF
ANTI-GANG INJUNCTIONS
A simple determination that gang activity constitutes a public nui-
sance does not complete the analysis. The second consideration when
examining the validity of a gang injunction explores the injunction's
constitutional dimension.
Applying constitutional principles to anti-gang injunctions requires
a clear understanding of the injunctions. Anti-gang injunctions usually
contain recurrent prohibitions.78 First, anti-gang injunctions normally
restrict gang members from association with each other within defined
areas.7 9 Gang members effectively are prohibited from associating with
each other on their "turf."8° Second, the anti-gang injunctions normally
include a restriction on local movement, e.g. being outdoors after dark,
fleeing from police, or illegally entering the home of another.8 Any
enjoined gang member who violates this provision of the ordinance will
be guilty of criminal contempt, curfew violation, resisting arrest, or tres-
74. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (1999) ("The State of California is in a state of crisis
which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize and commit a
multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods").
75. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601 (describing conduct of street gang).
76. See id. at 601-02; see also infra note 122 and accompanying text (describing attributes of
criminal street gang).
77. See generally Acuna, 929 P.2d at 596.
78. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 221-25 (stating that anti-gang injunctions share five recurrent
restrictions).
79. See id. at 222.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 224.
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passing.82 Third, anti-gang injunctions usually contain a restriction on
gang clothing and hand gestures.83 Gang members often wear colors,
such as blue or red, to show gang membership.84 Gang members also
commonly use hand gestures to communicate their gang membership to
other gang members.85 Once enjoined, the gang members are subject to
criminal contempt for wearing clothing bearing gang colors and from
using gang hand gestures within the area specified by the injunction.86
Fourth, anti-gang injunctions generally prohibit gang members from
intimidating, harassing, and annoying local residents.87 Enjoined gang
members who harass and intimidate local residents are subject to crimi-
nal contempt sanctions for violating the injunction, as well as prosecu-
tion for the substantive crimes.88
These restrictions have been attacked on numerous constitutional
grounds. Specifically, opponents have focused on the doctrines of
vagueness and overbreadth, the First Amendment right to free associa-
tion, the First Amendment right to freedom of expression, and proce-
dural due process.89
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
Some commentators have argued that the provisions of anti-gang
injunctions that restrict gang members from associating and prevent
them from annoying, harassing, and intimidating residents are invalid
under vagueness and overbreadth principles.90
1. VAGUENESS
Under vagueness principles, a regulation must be sufficiently clear
in defining the conduct that is prohibited.9' Thus, a regulation is uncon-
stitutionally void for vagueness if it will not be understood by individu-
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of modem street
gangs).
85. See id.
86. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 223.
87. See id. at 224.
88. See id.
89. See infra notes 91-214.
90. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance
Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 421-428 (1999)
(concluding anti-gang injunction in Acuna violated constitutional vagueness principles); Yoo,
supra note 10, at 249 (cautioning against violations of Vagueness and Overbreadth in anti-gang
injunctions); see also People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 629-30 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (concluding Acuna injunction violated Vagueness and Overbreadth doctrines).
91. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-71 (1972) (applying void for
vagueness principles).
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als of ordinary intelligence. 92
Some commentators argue that restrictions on gang member
associations are void for vagueness because a "gang member" cannot be
defined objectively.93 These critics conclude that gang members lack
sufficient notice of the prohibited associations and the police gain unfet-
tered discretion to determine whether a group of youths constitutes a
gang.
94
These arguments are without merit because a "gang member" can
be objectively defined. The California Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act provides an objective definition of gang member-
ship.95 The Act defines gangs by examining the intent of the individ-
ual.96 A "gang member" is defined as an individual who knowingly
belongs to a gang, i.e. has specific intent to be a gang member.97 Under
this definition, gang members have sufficient notice of what constitutes
a prohibited "gang association"-they must have specific intent to asso-
ciate with other gang members.98 Police, therefore, will not have unduly
broad enforcement authority because the State must prove specific intent
to show a violation of the gang association injunction. Accordingly,
courts can restrict the associations of gang members without offending
constitutional vagueness principles.
Opponents also argue that restrictions on gang members' annoy-
ance, harassment, and intimidation of residents are void for vagueness
because the words "annoy," "harass" and "intimidate" do not suffi-
ciently define the prohibited conduct. 99 This argument is misplaced.
Restrictions that define prohibited conduct as a "harassment," "annoy-
ance," or "intimidation," without more, have been struck down under
92. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-61 (1983) (discussing rationale of vagueness
doctrine).
93. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 248-51 (criticizing associational restrictions of anti-gang
injunctions); see also Werdegar, supra note 90, at 422-24 (arguing against constitutionality of
anti-gang injunction in Acuna); Malcolm W. Klein, What Are Street Gangs When They Get to
Court?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 515, 516 (1997) ("[E]fforts to determine who is and who is not a gang
member.., have failed, with numbers of false positives and false negatives often approaching the
numbers of agreed upon membership").
94. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 248-51 (analyzing associational restrictions); accord People ex
rel. Gallo v. Acuna 929 P.2d 596, 629-30 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (concluding Acuna
injunction is unconstitutionally vague).
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Accord People, v. Alberto R., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 357 (Cal. App. 1991) (upholding
provisions of Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act).
99. See Werdegar, supra note 90, at 422-23 (arguing against the constitutionality of anti-gang
injunctions); see also Acuna, 929 P.2d at 631 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (concluding certain provisions
of Acuna injunction are unconstitutionally vague).
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vagueness principles. °0 However, the California Supreme Court in
Acuna correctly noted that it is well established that such terms are not
unconstitutionally vague when they are defined within a statute or by the
contextual application of the restriction.' 0 '
Restrictions on gang members' harassment, intimidation and
annoyance of local residents are not unconstitutionally vague. Taken in
context, gang members and police officers know precisely what consti-
tutes an annoyance, harassment, and intimidation of residents - i.e., vio-
lence and threats of violence against residents suspected of reporting
gang activity to the police.' 02 Given the clarity and legitimacy of this
objective, anti-gang injunctions are not unconstitutionally vague.
2. OVERBREADTH
A regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad if it burdens a substan-
tial amount of constitutionally protected activity while purporting to
restrict only unprotected activity. 0 3 The same principle is applicable to
injunctions. 0 4 Some commentators have argued that restrictions on
gang members' harassment of residents is unconstitutionally overbroad
because protected forms of conduct may fall within the scope of the
restriction.10 5  An application of overbreadth principles indicates the
contrary.
As noted above, restrictions on gang members' annoyance, harass-
ment and intimidation of residents have specific connotations in the con-
text of gang activity, i.e., a prohibition of the use of violence or threats
of violence against residents suspected of reporting the gang's illegal
activities to the police.106 The injunction does not encompass protected
100. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1971) (rejecting
constitutionality of restriction on annoying, harassing, intimidating or threatening residents); see
also M. Katherine Boychuk, Comment: Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or
Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 769, 784 (1994) (applying vagueness principles to stalking laws).
101. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 612 (holding anti-gang injunction not unconstitutionally vague
where defined by context); State v. Smith, 737 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. App. 1988) (holding
restriction of "harassment" not unconstitutionally vague where prohibited conduct defined by
statute); People v. Whitfield, 498 N.E.2d 262, 266-67 (Ill. App. 1986) (holding that "harass" not
unconstitutionally vague when applied to context).
102. Nick Anderson, S.J. Makes Move to Reclaim Gang Territory, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 10, 1993, at IA (reporting traditional police methods have proven insufficient to control
gang activity in San Jose); Richard L. Colvin, Judge Issues Sweeping Injunction Against Gang,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at B I (home ed.) (reporting deficiencies of traditional police techniques
against gangs in Van Nuys).
103. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (applying overbreadth principles).
104. See Madsen v. Woman's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994).
105. See e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 630 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (concluding Acuna injunction is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (concluding anti-gang injunctions' restriction
on gang harassment of residents has specific connotations by reference to context).
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conduct, such as approaching and confronting residents for the purpose
of soliciting signatures on a petition or attempting to hand out fliers to
residents. In short, the only types of annoying, harassing or intimidating
conduct that lie within the scope of the restriction are violence and
threats of violence. As such, anti-gang injunctions comply with both
vagueness and overbreadth principles.
B. First Amendment Right to Free Association
Many commentators have argued that the First Amendment right to
free association provides gang members with the right to congregate in
the streets, at least when they congregate peaceably. ' 07 According to
these commentators, the state may prohibit the gang from engaging in
activity that is otherwise criminal, such as selling drugs or carrying ille-
gal weapons. On the other hand, the state may not prohibit gang mem-
bers simply from associating with each other.1°8
Such arguments take gang associations for more than their worth.
The right to free association under the First Amendment includes no
cognizable right for gang members to congregate in the streets, even if
they congregate peaceably. There is no general right of association.'0 9
Only certain designated categories of association implicate constitu-
tional protection. The categories are limited to "intimate associa-
tions, '"1 ° "expressive associations," 1 ' and the right of freedom from
so-called "guilt by association."' 12 Association among gang members
does not implicate any of these rights.
107. See Terrence R. Boga, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for
Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 477, 496 (1994) (concluding anti-gang injunctions
violate constitutional right to free association); Stewart, supra note 35, at 2276 (expressing
concerns regarding restrictions on gang members' association); Werdegar, supra note 90, at 432-
33 (concluding anti-gang injunctions violate Constitution); see also Christopher S. Yoo, supra
note 10, at 236 (cautioning against violating gang members' rights to free association).
108. See id.
109. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (noting
"[t]he close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly" does not indicate "that in every
setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective
process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution"); see also City of Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (rejecting general right to association).
110. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1990) (explaining First Amendment right of free association).
11. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 483 (1965) (holding right to association is
peripheral right under the First Amendment); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958) (holding right to expressive association exists under Fourteenth Amendment).
112. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 594 (1967) (discussing guilt by association).
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1. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
The United States Supreme Court has defined intimate associations
as "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other indi-
viduals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects
of one's life.""' 3 The Supreme Court has looked to the size, selectivity,
and purpose of the association in determining whether the association is
intimate." 4 Thus, familial associations are intimate associations pro-
tected by the Constitution." 5 By contrast, organizations such as Rotary
Clubs are not. 1 6
Street gangs do not fall within the Supreme Court's definition of
intimate associations. They are neither composed of a small number of
people, selective in membership, nor established for an intimate pur-
pose.' The membership of street gangs is large and fluid. 18 Modem
urban street gangs commonly are composed of hundreds of members,
each having varying degrees of involvement in gang activities and not
all of whom know each other. 1 9 Because this large and fluid member-
ship is not limited to an intimate group of individuals, the congregation
of street gangs is not protected as an intimate association.
Some commentators also have asserted that the impetus for the for-
mation of street gangs lies in the gang members' need for togetherness
in the face of a dearth of social institutions in which they can partici-
pate.' 20 Whether or not this is true is irrelevant. Regardless of the psy-
chological reasons for the formation of gangs, the fact remains that
gangs do not operate for any legitimate purpose, let alone an intimate
purpose.'' On the contrary, the activities of street gangs turn on territo-
113. Board of Directors Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (quoting
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)).
114. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546 (analyzing right to association in context of Rotary
Club).
115. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (discussing limits of First
Amendment associational right).
116. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545 (denying free association right of First Amendment to
Rotary Club).
117. See Stewart, supra note 35, at 2273-75 (discussing characteristics of American street
gangs).
118. See id. (describing various levels of gang membership).
119. See id. at 2275 (discussing characteristics of American street gangs).
120. See Boga, supra note 107, at 487 (discussing motive for poor youths in joining street
gangs); Stewart, supra note 35, at 2278 (arguing gang members resort to gang activities due to
lack of social institution in lower income urban areas); see generally MARTIN SANCHEZ
JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET (1991).
121. Even the opponents of anti-gang injunctions cannot deny the illicit nature of street gangs'
activities. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 35, at 2249 ("members of neighborhood gangs are
holding an alarming number of innocent citizens 'hostages in the hood'"). Indeed, the criminal
aspects of modem street gangs are disquieting. See DeNeen L. Brown & Ruben Castenada, Police
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rial control carried out with violence and threats of violence.' 2 Thus,
even if gang members are satisfying subconscious needs for together-
ness, gang activity remains overtly illicit. In short, gangs are character-
ized by a large, fluid membership and a criminal purpose. As such, they
are not "intimate associations" as defined by the Supreme Court.
2. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The Supreme Court has taken an increasingly restrictive view of
expensive associations by refusing to hold that the right to expressive
association includes the right to social association.12 3  The Court
requires a meaningful expression, e.g., an expression of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, or cultural viewpoints.'2 4 For exam-
ple, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin,'25 the Supreme Court refused to hold
that the association was a protected expressive association because the
association of teenagers at a dance-hall lacked a sufficiently expressive
purpose. 126 The Court wrote:
It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes - for example, walking down the street
or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall - but such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons -
coming together to engage in recreational dancing - is not protected
* . .as a form of "expressive association ....17
A plain examination of the attributes of urban street gangs reveals
that they do not advance any expressive purpose. Even the opponents of
anti-gang injunctions cannot deny that the activities of street gangs are
illicit. 128 Gang members congregate for the unlawful purpose of estab-
Say Turf Wars Fueled Day of Violence, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1993, at Al; Larry Gordon, Gang
Bullets Kill Child in Mother's Car, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al.
122. See supra note 121 (discussing gang members' apologists concessions of illicit nature of
street gangs).
123. See City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (rejecting general right to
association); see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)
("[t]he close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly" does not indicate "that in every
setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective
process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution.")
124. See Stranglin, 490 U.S. at 28 (rejecting teenagers' right to free association in dance halls);
see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (discussing First Amendment
right to association).
125. 490 U.S. at 25 (1989).
126. See id. at 23-25.
127. See id. at 25.
128. See also Boga, supra note 107, at 489 ("[c]ontrol over lucrative drug markets fuels gang
aggression as much as the desire to defend a self-declared turf from encroachment by rivals"); see
generally MALCOLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG (1995).
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lishing a neighborhood as their "turf."' 129  Once a neighborhood is
claimed to be gang turf, it is subject to the lawless activities of the street
gang, which frequently include drug trafficking and violence. 3 ' Thus,
gang activities may not be classified as expressive of any meaningful
viewpoints. 131
The Supreme Court has refused to hold that an association advanc-
ing unlawful activity is a protected expressive association, even when
the association is enmeshed with expressive activity. 3 2 In Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., 131 the Supreme Court held that an anti-
abortion group that harassed and intimidated the patients and employees
of abortion clinics was not a protected association.' 34 Although the
activities of the anti-abortion group contained expressive activity-
espousing the viewpoint that abortion is wrong-the Court held that the
anti-abortion group was not protected as an expressive association
because its purpose was primarily illegitimate.' 35
Like the abortion protesters in Madsen, gang members congregate
for primarily illicit purposes. 36 Unlike the abortion protesters, however,
the associations of gang members do not advance any cognizable
expressive viewpoint.' 37 Thus, street gangs are not protected expressive
associations under an application of Supreme Court precedent.
3. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION
The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of guilt by associa-
tion precludes an individual from being held liable for mere association
with another.' 38 Under this concept, individual members of an associa-
tion cannot be held liable for the association's illegal activities unless
129. See generally KLEIN, supra note 128 (explaining territorial aspects of American street
gangs).
130. See id.; see also People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (Cal. 1997) (describing
illicit activities of street gang in Rocksprings).
131. See KLEIN, supra note 128, and accompanying text (discussing illicit nature of street
gangs).
132. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (declining to hold
association for purpose of harassment and intimidation is protected by First Amendment); see also
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) ("[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment").
133. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
134. See id. (detailing anti-abortion group's activities).
135. See id.
136. Cf id. at 2532; see also supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text (examining lack of
expressive purpose of street gangs).
137. See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text (examining lack of expressive purpose of
street gangs).
138. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (declining to enjoin
civil rights protesters); see also 16 AM JUR 2D Constitutional Law § 539 (summarizing Supreme
Court's guilt by association decisions).
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each member necessarily has specific intent to further the illegal activi-
ties of the association.' 3 9 This doctrine is depicted by the contrast
between NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,'4 ° in which the Court invali-
dated an injunction issued against civil rights protesters,' 4 ' and Madsen
v. Woman's Health Center, Inc., '42 in which the Court upheld an injunc-
tion issued against a group that intimidated and harassed the patients and
employees of an abortion clinic. 14 3
In Claiborne Hardware, Afro-American civil rights protesters boy-
cotted various white merchants."' Although some of the civil rights
protesters demonstrated peacefully, the protests became disorderly
because many of the participants committed violent crimes during the
protests. 45 In response to the protesters, the merchants successfully
sought an injunction that precluded all the protesters from further dem-
onstrations. 4 6 The Supreme Court struck down the injunction, noting
that, although many of the civil rights protesters committed crimes, it
could not be established that each protester necessarily had a specific
intent to commit crime.'47 The injunction violated the guilt by associa-
tion doctrine because it restricted the entire group of protesters, not all of
whom had a criminal intent. 48
In Madsen, abortion protesters harassed and intimidated patrons
and employees of an abortion clinic in an attempt to block access to the
clinic. 149 Whereas the civil rights protesters in Claiborne Hardware did
not all share an unlawful purpose, all of the abortion protesters in Mad-
sen attempted to unlawfully block access to the abortion clinic by har-
assment and intimidation. "° Therefore, in Madsen, the Supreme Court
held that freedom of association "does not extend to joining, with others
for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights."' 15'
The question thus becomes whether each member of a street gang
necessarily has a specific intent to further the illegitimate purpose of the
gang. The answer here is in the affirmative. As set forth above, like the
139. Compare Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 919 (refusing to issue injunction against
civil rights protesters), with Madsen v. Women Health Care Center, 512 U.S. 776 (1994)
(upholding injunction against association that threatened and intimidated abortion clinic).
140. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
141. Id. at 911.
142. 512 U.S. 776 (1994).
143. See id. at 786.
144. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 897-900.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 899.
147. See id. at 920.
148. See id.
149. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-8.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 776.
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protesters in Madsen, street gangs have no legitimate purpose, and exist
solely for the purpose of committing crime. 152 Each gang member, in
joining his fellow gang members on the "turf," knowingly furthers the
gang's criminal purpose by providing additional strength to the presence
of the gang. In contrast to the protesters in Claiborne, gang members
are intentionally contributing to gang problems rather than attempting to
convey a social message.
To be sure, some commentators have argued that the large, fluid
nature of gangs precludes the gang from having any central purpose, and
thus precludes each member from necessarily sharing a criminal pur-
pose.15 3 Gangs are loosely connected groups with a fluid membership
and have been known to have hundreds of members. 154 One commenta-
tor has noted that street gangs typically have several levels of member-
ship.' 5 5  First, there is the hardened core of members who are,
essentially, the gang's leaders. This level typically represents about one-
half of the gang's membership and has an active role in determining
gang activities. 56 Second, a gang has a peripheral class of members. 15 7
Although peripheral members do not have a leadership status, they
nonetheless participate in gang activities.158 Third, a gang has a "wan-
nabe" class - individuals who are not actually members but who roam
the streets wearing gang colors and proclaiming gang membership. 59
Notwithstanding the size and diversity of gang membership, how-
ever, gang members all share at least one characteristic-knowingly
promoting the territorial street crimes of the gang itself. Each gang
member knows that appearing on gang "turf' while wearing gang colors
reinforces the gang's illicit purposes by making the gang appear stronger
and more intimidating to local residents. 60 Thus, street gangs can be
enjoined without offense to the guilt by association doctrine because
each gang member has the specific intent to further the gang's crimes.' 6 1
152. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing nature and purpose of street
gangs).
153. See Stewart, supra note 35, at 2276 (expressing concerns regarding restrictions on gang
members' association); Werdegar, supra note 90, at 432-33 (concluding anti-gang injunctions
violate Constitution); see also Yoo, supra note 10, at 236 (cautioning against violating gang
members' rights to free association).
154. See Stewart, supra note 35, at 2275; Werdegar, supra note 90, at 431; see generally
KLEIN, supra note 128 (describing attributes of street gangs).
155. See Stewart, supra note 35, at 2275 (describing various levels of gang membership).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See People v. Vario Posole Locos, No. N76652 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Co., Nov. 19,
1997).
161. Accord Bergen Herd, Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-Related Problems in California
(Vol. 54:47
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AT ITS WORD
Neither the doctrine of intimate association, expressive association,
nor guilt by association shields gangs from an injunction. Accordingly,
the First Amendment right to free association does not preclude
enjoining gangs as a public nuisance.
C. Free Speech
Gang members commonly wear colors, such as blue or red, to show
gang membership. 162 Gang members also frequently use hand gestures
to communicate their gang membership to other members.' 63 Once
enjoined, street gang members may be subject to criminal contempt for
wearing clothing bearing gang colors and for using gang hand gestures
within the area specified by the injunction."6 At least one commentator
has argued that such restrictions violate the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. 165
Given the limited authority on these issues, an analysis of the con-
stitutionality of restrictions on gang hand gestures and clothing requires
a novel application of First Amendment principles. The Supreme Court
has held that the level of scrutiny applicable to restrictions on speech
and expression depends on the nature of the restriction itself. 66 The
First Amendment is not implicated by restrictions on speech or conduct
that lack an expressive element. 167  A restriction on conduct with an
expressive element is valid if the restriction is related to an important
state interest that is unrelated to the suppression of a message's view-
point.168 A restriction on speech is valid if it is content-neutral in time,
place, and manner 169 or if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest.170  Thus, the applicable standard for anti-gang injunctions
After People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 629, 672-
73 (1998) (arguing each member of street gang implicitly furthers collective purpose of street
gang).
162. See supra notes 74-76, 121 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of modem street
gangs).
163. See id.
164. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 221.
165. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 242 (concluding injunction against the use of gang hand
gestures and the wearing of gang clothing seems to violate gang members' First Amendment
rights).
166. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text (discussing limits of First Amendment's
protection of free speech).
167. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (declining to extend First
Amendment protections to activity containing only "kernel" of expression).
168. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1968) (explaining constitutional standard applicable to regulations on expressive
conduct).
169. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educ's Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (addressing
the time, place, and manner restriction on protected speech).
170. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); see also Hines v. City of
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depends on whether a restriction on gang hand gestures and clothing is a
restriction of activity not protected by the First Amendment, a restriction
on conduct with an expressive element, or a restriction on fully protected
speech. '71
The absence of an expressive message in gang hand gestures and
clothing places them beyond the scope of the First Amendment.17 An
examination of the policies underlying the First Amendment indicates
that an expressive element of a communication is a prerequisite to First
Amendment protection.'7 3  Specifically, the general policies underlying
the freedom afforded by the First Amendment are threefold: the "Mar-
ketplace of Ideas" the "Democratic Forum" and "Self-Realization."' ' 74
1. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS POLICY
Justice Holmes referred to the consideration that truth emerges
from the unfettered exchange of thoughts as the "Marketplace of Ideas"
policy. ' Under the "Marketplace of Ideas" approach, any communica-
tion expressing a cognizable idea is protected speech. 76 By contrast,
any communication or conduct that does not contain a cognizable idea is
not entitled to First Amendment protection. At least one commentator
has argued that gang hand gestures and clothing involve the communica-
tion of expressive ideas because both gang hand gestures and gang
clothing convey a signal to other gang members. 177
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976) (holding that narrowly drawn ordinance may regulate
solicitation to protect citizens from crime and annoyance).
171. See Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional
Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285, 320 (1993) (summarizing various possible
constitutional standards applicable to begging prohibitions).
172. Accord id. at 323 (discussing Framers' intent underlying First Amendment). Teir notes
that the determination of the level of free speech protection afforded to begging turns on the
question of what constitutes a message. Id. at 322.
173. See Teir, supra note 171, at 323 (concluding spoken words must contain message to be
afforded First Amendment protections); see also infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text
(discussing First Amendment policies).
174. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 898-904 (1991) (identifying free speech policies as
Enlightenment Value, Democratic Governance Value and Self-Realization Value).
175. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762-765 (1976) (emphasizing the
exchange of ideas as a fundamental free speech policy); see generally Ingber, The Marketplace of
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. I (explaining Marketplace of Ideas policy); Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 967-981 (1978)
(explaining importance of free speech); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM.B. FoUND RES. J. 523, 551.
176. See generally Ingber, supra note 175.
177. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 240 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
(1974) and concluding that restriction on gang hand gestures and clothing violate First
Amendment). Concededly, Yoo is correct at first glance. The United States Supreme Court has
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Gang hand gestures and clothing, however, involve no meaningful
idea. A street gang does not seek to advance any religious, political,
social, cultural, or economic values. 78 On the contrary, the gang's pri-
mary purpose is criminal and devoid of expressive value. 79 Just as all
other gang activities are directed towards illicit purposes that are devoid
of social value, gang hand gestures and clothing are directed towards
these purposes as well. When a gang member wears gang clothing and
uses gang hand gestures, he is displaying the gang's force over the
neighborhood and communicating that this neighborhood belongs to the
gang. Such conduct has no value in the "Marketplace of Ideas" envi-
sioned by Justice Holmes.
2. THE DEMOCRATIC FORUM POLICY
Professor Meiklejohn observed that people in a democratic society
have a duty to "think their own thoughts, to express them, and to listen
to the arguments of others."' 80 Justice Holmes observed, "[I]t is ... not
free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought we
hate."'' In short, under the "Democratic Forum" policy, words or con-
duct that express any thought or opinion are protected speech.'
82
As applied to street gangs, a democratic duty to tolerate gang hand
gestures and clothing would arise if their use expressed any meaningful
idea. As noted above, however, gang hand gestures and clothing only
further the illicit activities of the gang.' 8 3 Therefore, a restriction on
gang hand gestures and clothing does not implicate the duty to tolerate
diverse ideas, nor does such a restriction preclude any gang member
from expressing meaningful views. Anti-gang injunctions thus do not
offend the Democratic Forum policy.
held that the test for whether conduct falls within the ambit of First Amendment protection is
whether "an intent to convey a particularized message was present" and whether "the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." See Spence, 418 U.S. at
410-11. The Spence test, however, does not resolve the issue. A communication, alone, does not
place an expression into the protections of the First Amendment. The expression itself must be
protected. See infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text (analyzing limits of First Amendment).
A gang's message, like other aspects of street gangs, are inseparable from the gang's criminal
activities and does not advance any meaningful expression. Thus, gang hand gestures and
clothing are not a "particularized message" as contemplated in Spence and are not, in any event,
protected by the First Amendment. See id.
178. See supra notes 74-77, 121 and accompanying text (discussing nature of street gangs).
179. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics of street gangs);
cf KLEIN, supra note 93 (discussing attributes of street gangs).
180. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 24
(1965) (explaining free speech protections).
181. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
182. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 174, at 900 (analyzing policies underlying First
Amendment).
183. See supra note 74-77, 121 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of street gangs).
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3. THE SELF-REALIZATION POLICY
The inherent human need to express one's thoughts is the justifica-
tion for the "Self Realization" policy.'84 People must "express their
opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living." '"15 Thus,
under the "Self-Realization" policy, any communication that involves
the need to convey one's opinions, feelings, or impressions is protected
speech. '
86
The inherent human need to express meaningful ideas is not satis-
fied by the use of gang hand gestures and clothing. On the contrary, the
use of gang hand gestures and clothing, as well as all other gang activi-
ties, stems from the destructive desire to dominate a neighborhood and
intimidate the other inhabitants of that neighborhood. 187 In the words of
"Monster Kody," a Crip gang member in Los Angeles:
I lived for the power surge of playing God, having the power of
life and death in my hands. Nothing I knew could compare with
riding in a car with three other homeboys with guns, knowing that
they were as deadly and courageous as I was. To me, at that time in
my life, this was power. l'8
Such words are far removed from the human desire to express
one's creative feelings and opinions. The fact that this desire manifests
itself in clothing and hand gestures does not place such activities within
the ambit of the "Self-Realization" policy, nor any other policy underly-
ing the First Amendment.
Both gang hand gestures and clothing are inseparable from other
elements of gang activity. The purpose of gang gestures and clothing,
like other types of gang activity, is to assert the power of the gang on the
surrounding neighborhood at the expense of the rights of other inhabit-
ants. Because the policies that underlie the First Amendment are not
served by such activities, gang hand gestures and clothing are beyond
the ambit of the First Amendment. Accordingly, gang hand gestures and
clothing can be restricted without First Amendment implication.
184. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 174, at 903; Redish, Tle Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982).
185. Accord L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-I at 786 (2d ed. 1986) (asserting
"cry of impulse" is protected speech).
186. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 174, at 903 (describing Self-Realization approach to
First Amendment).
187. The desire to intimidate and hurt others is a common motive for gang activity. See Boga,
supra note 107, at 491 (pointing to gang member's words reflecting desire to scare and harm
others).
188. Id. at 488.
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D. Procedural Due Process
The unique nature of the anti-gang injunction also has raised con-
cerns that anti-gang injunctions violate the procedural due process
rights.' 89 Some commentators note that anti-gang injunctions, like other
public nuisance injunctions, are civil proceedings.' 90 A gang member
who violates the injunction, however, is held in criminal contempt and
may be subject to fines or jail.' 9 1 These commentators conclude that
anti-gang injunctions impose criminal liability on gang members while
circumventing the requisite criminal due process requirements, including
the right to court-appointed counsel. 92 Other commentators argue that
gang members do not frequently attend the injunction hearing because
they do not understand the legal process.' 93 These commentators argue
that anti-gang injunctions are essentially an ex parte process. 194
Both of these arguments have been appropriately rejected by Cali-
fornia courts. 95 The enjoined gang members are not subject to any fine
or sentenced to any time in jail.' 96 The anti-gang injunction is not even
entered on their criminal records.' 97 On the contrary, gang members
will not be subject to any criminal liability if they abide by the terms of
the civil injunction. 198
189. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 253 (questioning adequacy of procedural protections afforded
gang members by anti-gang injunctions); Werdegar, supra note 90, at 433-34 (arguing anti-gang
injunctions violate procedural due process); cf Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 482 (1974)
(cautioning against the use of civil remedies with penal effects); FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 107 (1963) ("[T]o make the infraction of a criminal statute also
a contempt of court is essentially an invention to evade the safeguards of criminal procedure and
to change the tribunal for determining guilt").
190. See generally 58 AM. JUR 2D Nuisance (defining attributes of actions to abate nuisances).
191. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1364-69 (1991) (discussing criminal contempt sanctions for violation of civil
injunction); Yoo, supra note 10, at 254-55 (discussing criminal aspects of anti-gang injunctions).
192. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 253 (concluding use of anti-gang injunction as a civil remedy
violates procedural due process); Werdegar, supra note 90 (stating anti-gang injunctions violate
procedural due process).
193. See Werdegar, supra note 90, at 434-35 (pointing out reluctance of gang members to
attend anti-gang injunction proceedings).
194. See id. at 435-36; Yoo, supra note 10, at 243-44.
195. See People v. 18th St. Gang, No. BC-190334 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Sept
10, 1998) (denying motion by public defender to appoint counsel for defendant gang members in
civil suit to enjoin gang as public nuisance); see generally Rebecca Porter, In California, Motion
Denied for Gang Member Counsel, 34 Nov TRIAL 112 (1998) (discussing trial court's denial of
public defenders motion).
196. See generally Porter, supra note 195 (discussing trial court's reasoning in finding no
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel for anti-gang injunctive proceedings).
197. Cf People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
198. Cf id.
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To be sure, a gang member who violates the terms of an anti-gang
injunction is guilty of criminal contempt, which may result in criminal
liability.199 Upon being charged with criminal contempt, gang members
do receive full criminal procedural protections, including the right to
counsel and the right to a trial.20 Thus, criminal procedural issues are
not implicated by the imposition of an anti-gang injunction. The initial
anti-gang injunction entails only a civil remedy that restricts the ability
of gang members to congregate in the streets and commit crime.
In Mathews v. Elderidge,2 °' the United States Supreme Court set
forth a three-part balancing test to determine the appropriate level of
process required where there has been a deprivation of a right in a civil
proceeding. 2  This test requires the court to weigh: (1) the nature of the
individual right at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
right; and (3) the State's interest in expedience. 0 3 The most frequent
result under the Mathews balancing test is that the defendant being
deprived of a right is entitled to notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. 2 4
Where the State's interest in expedience is substantial, however, such as
a seizure of movable property that a defendant may conceal if he is
afforded pre-deprivation notice, courts generally hold that a defendant
only has a right to notice and a post-deprivation hearing. 0 5 Conversely,
where the nature of the individual right is substantial, courts hold that
the defendant is entitled to the right to counsel.20 6 In the absence of a
deprivation of a substantial right, courts have been reluctant to hold that
indigent defendants are entitled to court-appointed attorneys in civil
actions.0 7
The frequent failure of gang members to attend their hearings and
the non-appointment of counsel for indigent gang members not violate
199. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 254 (pointing to criminal nature of anti-gang injunctions); see
generally Werdegar, supra note 90 (discussing punitive aspects of anti-gang injunctions).
200. See Yoo, supra note 10, at 266 (discussing criminal contempt proceedings).
201. 424 U.S 319 (1976).
202. See id. at 334-335.
203. See id. at 335.
204. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1495 (1983)
(concluding due process principles required notice and opportunity to respond at hearing).
205. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) (holding
seizure of yacht was subject to notice and post-deprivation hearing because of risk of defendant
taking yacht before hearing).
206. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20-24 (1981) (holding indigent
defendant was entitled to court-appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings).
207. See Cloutterbuck v. Cloutterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082, 1085-87 (D.C. App. 1989) (rejecting
right to counsel in context of civil protection order); Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288, 293 (Alaska
1985) (rejecting fight to counsel in context of civil forfeiture action); see also Kevin W.
Shaughnessy, Note, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: A New Balancing Test for Indigent
Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L. REV., 261, 285 (1982) (indicating that Lassiter would be
"eviscerated" by cases rejecting right to counsel).
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the procedural due process standard announced in Mathews and its prog-
eny. Anti-gang injunctive proceedings afford gang members notice and
a pre-deprivation hearing. Each gang member may attend the hearing to
explain why the proposed injunction would be erroneous. 2°8 The fact
that most gang members choose to ignore the hearing does not render
the hearing ex parte, nor does it have any bearing on the due process
question. Any resemblance that anti-gang injunctive hearings may have
to be an ex parte hearing is attributable to the gang member's choice not
to attend.
The lack of court-appointed counsel at anti-gang injunctive pro-
ceedings also complies with procedural due process requirements.
Courts are unwilling to recognize a right to counsel for any anti-gang
injunctive hearings because associations of gang members simply are
not fundamental rights. 20 9 This assertion can be illustrated by consider-
ing the worst case scenario. If a court issued an erroneous injunction
against a group of youths that it mistakenly believed to be a street gang,
the right to congregate in the street has been lost. This right is not analo-
gous to the rights involved in cases where courts recognize the right to
counsel, e.g. actions to terminate parental rights2 1 or actions to involun-
tarily commit an individual to a psychiatric institution.211
Thus, gang members have fair notice, an opportunity to respond,
and no cognizable right to court appointed counsel. As a result, no due
process rights are violated by these injunctions. Nor are the First
Amendment right to free association, the First Amendment right to free
expression, or the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines capable of being
read so expansively as to preclude the injunction of criminal street
gangs. 2 12 Anti-gang injunctions are an effective remedy for the other-
wise uncontrollable egregious acts of lawlessness committed by street
213gangs. In the face of the flagrant disorder unleashed by street gangs
on local communities, it becomes the duty of the state to fight back by
tailoring the appropriate solution.2 4  The anti-gang injunction is an
208. See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, Gangbusters, Enjoining the Boys il the "Hood", Am.
Prospect, May-June 1997 (discussing lack of resistance to injunctions by gang members).
209. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text (explaining case law interpreting due
process fight to court appointed counsel).
210. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (upholding right to
counsel for parental termination proceedings).
211. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (upholding fight to counsel for involuntary
commitment).
212. See supra notes 78-188 and accompanying text (addressing whether anti-gang injunctions
violate substantive constitutional fights of gang members).
213. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing success of anti-gang injunctions).
214. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing duty of State to take reasonable
steps to ensure order); see also Acuna, 929 P.2d at 618 ("[Pjreserving the peace is the first duty of
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effective remedy that defends the rights of the many and does not violate
the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
CONCLUSION
Unique problems demand unique solutions. The English nobles of
King Richard's era, who framed the concept of a public nuisance, could
not have known that they were creating a vehicle that would combat
problems of urban street gangs centuries later. Nonetheless, the princi-
ple remains the same - sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus, or one must
use his own right as not to infringe on the rights of others.2" 5 Street
gangs, like traditional public nuisances, pose a substantial and unreason-
able interference to public rights.
Several states have passed legislation criminalizing gang activi-
ties.2"6 Such legislation also could declare gang activities a nuisance per
se and provide a procedure for city attorneys, district attorneys, or the
state attorneys general to abate the nuisance and obtain compensatory
damages for the benefit of the local community.
The new problems confronting America require more than the
application of conventional law enforcement techniques with brute
force. They require the adaptation of old principles of law to new and
unique problems. As America is confronted with more complex
problems, the several states and their citizens must continue to act
resourcefully in finding creative solutions. Anti-gang injunctions are
one of the most promising methods of curbing urban violence.
government, and it is for the protection of the community from the predations of the idle, the
contentious and the brutal that government was invented").
215. See Richardson v. Kiev, 34 Cal. 63, 73 (1867) (stating general maxim underlying public
nuisance actions).
216. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20 (1997); FLA. STAT § 870.04 (1997); ARIZ. STAT § 13-
105, subd. 7, 8. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly known
as the RICO Act, has also been found to render gang activity a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1994) (providing that use of any income from, acquisition of any interest in, or
conducting enterprise through, a pattern of racketeering activity is unlawful); United States v.
Bates, 843 F. Supp. 437, 440-41 (N.D. I11. 1994) (holding certain activities of the El Rukn street
gang are prohibited by RICO Act).
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